Linguistic Inversion

[Georges Metanomski <zgmet(at)wanadoo.fr>]

Attached is the new chapter of the RD site Linguistic Inversion.

Georges.
Linguistic Inversion.
---------------------

NOTE 1: By "Predicate Logic" will be understood the
"Predicate Calculus of First Order", the current
pretended foundation of the Set Theory and Mathematics).
Note 2:Attribute and "Property" are considered below as synonyms.
NOTE 3:"ref." will denote below:
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/metanomskiindex.htm

In "Reflection Spiral" we distinguished between Noumenalistic and 
Phenomenalistic view. We shall discuss them in some detail in "Crisis 
of Noumenalism" and "RD'S Phenomenalistic Logic". The present chapter 
is restricted to the discussion of  the basic linguistic structure
"[Entity] is [Attribute]", eg. "My car is green" as seen by these two
views.

Noumenalism being very vast and equally vague, we shall represent it 
with its pretended rigorous and scientific domain, that of Predicate
Logic. 

For the Predicate Logic Entity is some "thing in the world", "object" or 
"being", whatever it may mean, which may or not HAVE Attributes and exists 
independently of them. Attribute is a "being" as well, but of some different
type, so that it cannot be an Entity. What's a "being" and what ("being"?)
decides that two "beings" are different is left in the dark. The only hint 
we get is that Entity is a kind of "being" which may be subject of a 
proposition and Attribute is a different kind of "being" which may be a 
predicate, but never a subject.

Now, as to HAVING Attributes: Entity appears to the Predicate Logic as an 
Aggregate-Container containing several Parts-Attributes. "My car" HAS the 
Attribute "Green" among thousands of other ones. Whatever "being" may mean, 
Entity appears to the Predicate Logic as some more general "being" composed 
of some less general "beings"-Attributes.

On the face of it, it seems acceptable, if not obvious,  because we are
accustomed to express ourselves in terms of the natural language which 
has been created and refined during millennia to express our "common sense". 
The linguistic construct "My car is Green" is interpreted by the "common
sense" as "My car has the Property of being Green".
 
But "common sense", when misused, is the worst guide in science. Let's 
have a closer look at the construct "[Entity] is [Attribute]".  

It's enough to look at our example "My car is green" to see the inversion 
and its nonsense. "Green" is clearly more general than "My car". It
encompasses "My car" among trillions of "green entities" such as all green 
leaves of all trees, all strands of grass of all fields and meadows.                             
 
Thus "Green" is Aggregate and "My car" is its Part. As Aggregate "Green"
becomes Entity and, finally: [Entity] "Green" encompasses [Entity] "My car".
 
Predicate Logic will argue that "Green", being an "Attribute" is a different 
kind of "being" than Entity and cannot be raised to the status of Entity.
 
This appears to us as a necessary and sufficient reason to refute the
noumenalistic Predicate Logic and to embrace the Phenomenalistic view,
for which Entity is a collection of Attributes and nothing else, for
which a single Attribute is already a legitimate full blown Entity,
for which, if all Attributes vanish, the Entity, being nothing more 
than their collection, vanishes on the same occasion.

Consequently, RD refutes Noumenalism in general and the Predicate Logic 
in particular, embracing without restriction the Phenomenalistic view,
for which Entity "Green" encompasses unnumerable green Entities,
including "My car". 

Foundations of RD's Logic, Construct Theory (RD's substitute of Set Theory)
and Semantics will be discussed in chapters "RD's Phenomenalistic Logic", 
"Foundations of Construct Theory" and "Foundations of RD Semantics". 
The present chapter lays their cornerstone by interpreting "My car is Green" 
as "(Entity) My car is (encompassed by Entity) Green", in sharp contradiction 
with the noumenalistic inversion "My car has the Property of being green".

This cornerstone is illustrated by the Figure below, which copies Structure 2 
of Fig. 2 of the chapter "Reflection Spiral".

Let's note in particular following Relations among Entities: "colour" 
encompasses "white" and "black"; "white" encompasses "moon" and "other
bodies" encompassing in turn "stars" and "planets"; "black" and "surface"
encompass "sky", which is the proper logical map of the natural language
proposition "sky is a black surface".